ABSTRACT In recent years, many scholars have been committed to improving the security and practicability of chaotic image encryption. In addition, their proposed schemes mainly focus on two aspects, new or improved chaotic systems and new or improved encryption processes. However, according to cryptanalysis works of scholars, encryption processes of chaotic image encryption schemes deserve more attentions. In this paper, a recently reported chaotic image encryption scheme named the 2D logisticadjusted-sine-map-based image encryption scheme is comprehensively investigated, and some security, practicability, and rationality problems are found. Therefore, we first point out these problems existing in the reported encryption scheme and make some improvements in practicability and rationality. Next, under the conditions of chosen plaintext attack, we cryptanalyze it and propose a corresponding attack algorithm. For our attack algorithm, simulation test results show that it can completely recover plain images without knowing any secret key related information. Finally, we also present some possible improvements for the security problems of chaotic image encryption scheme under study.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the application of information technology is more and more extensive, secure and efficient transmissions of digital images have become the focus of attention. Because of the intrinsic features of digital image data, such as bulk data capacity, strong interpixel correlation, and high information redundancy, traditional encryption technologies, such as data encryption standard (DES) and advanced encryption standard (AES), cannot be well applied to the digital image encryption. Due to the inherent characteristics of chaotic systems, such as sensitivity to initial values, randomness, ergodicity etc., which are very suitable for the requirements of cryptosystem, Fridrich [2] pioneers the application of chaotic system to the image encryption. Since then, a large number of chaotic image encryption schemes have been proposed [3] - [14] . For examples, Chen et al. [9] propose a symmetric image encryption scheme based on the 3D chaotic cat map. This scheme uses the 3D cat map to shuffle the positions of image pixels and utilizes another chaotic map to confuse the relationship between the cipher image and the plain image; Pareek et al. [10] propose a scheme for image encryption based on the chaotic logistic maps, so as to meet the requirements of secure image transfer. In their scheme, eight different types of operations are used to encrypt the pixels of an image and which one of them are to be used for a particular pixel is determined by the output of logistic map; Abd El-Latif et al. [11] present a scheme based on the chaotic system for the quantum encryption of healthcare images. In their scheme, the scrambled quantum image is encrypted using a quantum exclusive or (XOR) operation based on a key generator controlled by the logistic-sine map; Guo et al. [12] propose a simple image encryption scheme using the beta chaotic map for performing the confusion and diffusion of plain images; Zhang et al. [13] utilize the Feistel network and the dynamic deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) encoding to devise a chaotic image encryption scheme using the permutation-diffusion-scrambling structure; And Wang et al. [14] propose a chaotic image encryption scheme employing the Josephus traversing and a mixed chaotic map, which includes a key-stream-generation process, a three-round scrambling process, and a one-round diffusion process.
During the development of chaotic image encryption technology, cryptanalyses of chaotic image encryption schemes are also in progress [15] - [28] . We can enumerate some of these works. Alvareza et al. [15] describe the security weakness of an image encryption scheme based on a logistic-like chaotic map. They point out that the distribution of this map is a bad candidate for constructing a pseudo-random stream generator; For a 3D cat map based symmetric image encryption scheme, Wang et al. [16] identify some essential weaknesses of it, and propose a successful chosen plaintext attack; Li et al. [23] find out three security drawbacks in a color image encryption scheme based on the hybrid hyper-chaotic system and cellular automata, and then successfully carry out chosen plaintext attack; For a recently reported hyper-chaotic image encryption scheme using the DNA encryption technology, Feng and He [24] point out some security, practicability, and feasibility problems identified in it, and propose a chosen plaintext attack algorithm; Jolfaei et al. [25] summarize the previous works about the cryptanalyses of permutation-only image encryption schemes, and make the cryptanalysis works on chosen plaintext attack complete and more efficient. They prove that in all permutation-only image ciphers, permutation mappings can be recovered completely by chosen plaintext attack; Zhu and Sun [26] cryptanalyze a newly proposed image encryption scheme using the enhanced chaotic tent map, and break the equivalent keys of the cryptosystem with chosen plaintext attack; Preishuber et al. [28] demonstrate that several statistical tests, commonly used to assess the security of chaos-based encryption schemes, are insufficient metrics for security analysis. They also indicate that these tests can only give a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for security.
As we know, cryptanalysis research has greatly promoted the development of chaotic image encryption technology, the weaknesses exposed in cryptanalysis works will be considered in new schemes, so as to avoid the recurrences of same weaknesses. However, some of latest image encryption schemes published in prominent publications still have problems and have not been pointed out. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to study these image encryption schemes and point out the security, practicality, and rationality problems. In this paper, we comprehensively investigate a chaotic image encryption scheme named 2D logistic-adjusted-sinemap-based image encryption scheme (LAS-IES) [1] , and find out that it does not have the claimed security. Namely, it cannot effectively resist chosen plaintext attack. In addition, LAS-IES also has some practicability and rationality problems. Specifically, these problems include:
1) The generation of chaotic system parameters is wrongly described as ''Secret key generation,'' and the pixel-level processing is wrongly described as the bit-level processing.
2) There is no specific generation process of the chaotic matrices. However, this generation process is closely related to the practicability and security of LAS-IES.
3) The design of chaotic-system-parameter-generation algorithm is unreasonable, and can be significantly simplified.
4) A large number of equivalent secret keys can be easily found, hence the key space is not as large as the claimed one of original paper.
5) The design of random-value-pixel insertion violates Kerckhoffs' principle and is meaningless under chosen plaintext attack.
6) The description of the permutation process is not sufficient and lacks the fundamental details. And the design of the entire permutation process is also can be greatly simplified.
7) The key streams only depend on secret keys. When different plain images are encrypted, the key streams remain unchanged.
In the process of pointing out these problems, we also present the improvements to address the practicability and rationality problems. Then, under the conditions of chosen plaintext attack, we cryptanalyze the scheme under study and propose a specific attack algorithm. For the proposed attack algorithm, the test results show that it can completely recover the plain images without knowing any key-related information. Finally, we discuss the possible improvements for the security problems of LAS-IES.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, LAS-IES is introduced; In Section III, we point out the security, practicability, and rationality problems found in LAS-IES, and put forward the improvements to address the practicability and rationality problems; In Section IV, LAS-IES is cryptanalyzed and a corresponding attack algorithm is proposed; In Section V, the simulation tests are carried out for the feasibility and effectiveness of proposed attack algorithm; In Section VI, we present some suggestions to further improve the security of LAS-IES; And in the last section, the paper in concluded.
II. INTRODUCTION TO LAS-IES
In this section, we will introduce LAS-IES as it is. And the problems that exist will be pointed out in Section III. In addition, we will use the original notations as many as possible. If a notation is not specifically stated, then the definition of it is consistent with the original paper. LAS-IES is based on 2D Logistic-Adjusted-Sine Map (2D-LASM), which is a two-dimensional chaotic system derived from the sine and logistic maps. Since we only focus on the identified security, practicality, and rationality problems of LAS-IES, 2D-LASM will not be introduced here. For the details of 2D-LASM, please refer to [1] . Below we will introduce the four main steps of LAS-IES, which are secret key generation, randomvalue-pixel insertion, bit manipulation confusion, and bit manipulation diffusion.
A. SECRET KEY GENERATION
In LAS-IES, the permutation process and the diffusion process are iterated twice, so two chaotic matrices S 1 and S 2 composed of chaotic state values are used. In this regard, LAS-IES adopts the strategy of generating the chaotic state values with different initial chaotic state values and control parameters. That is, (x 1 0 , y 1 0 , µ 1 ) and (x 2 0 , y 2 0 , µ 2 ) are generated by a 232-bit secret key, and these two sets of parameters are used to generate the chaotic state values through 2D-LASM. And then the generated chaotic state values are used to construct S 1 and S 2 . Algorithm 1 of the original paper presents the process of generating the initial values and control parameters through the secret key. Since this algorithm is not well explained in the original paper, we provide a more intuitive description to it below.
Firstly, generate x 0 , y 0 , µ, w, γ 1 , and γ 2 .
According to the example given in the Section 4.1 of the original paper, we can determine that the 232 bits of secret key K are processed from left to right. The weighted sum of first 52 bits of K are calculated in the form of big-endian, and then multiplied by 2 −52 to get x 0 . Similarly, y 0 , µ, and w are determined by calculating the second, third, and fourth 52 bits of K in the same way. The last 24 bits of K will not multiplied by 2 −52 , and the weighted sum is directly calculated in the form of big-endian. The weighted sum of first 12 bits is γ 1 and the weighted sum of last 12 bits is γ 2 . Secondly, generate (x 1 0 , y 1 0 , µ 1 ) withx 0 , y 0 , w, and γ 1 , and generate (x 2 0 , y 2 0 , µ 2 ) with x 0 , y 0 , w, and γ 2 .
where (2) and (3) ensure the obtained initial values (
, and (4) ensures that 2D-LASM is in the hyper-chaotic state. Namely, the control parameters (µ 1 , µ 2 ) ∈ [0.5, 0.9).
Finally, in order to ensure that the obtained initial state values of 2D-LASM are not 0s, Algorithm 1 of the original paper replaces the initial value of 0 that may be obtained with 0.4.
B. RANDOM-VALUE-PIXEL INSERTION
In LAS-IES, the original authors first add a large number of random value pixels to the plain image P. And they do not describe how these random values are specifically obtained. The added random value pixels consist of 2 rows and 2 columns, where the rows are added above and below P, and the columns are added to the left and right sides of P, as shown in Fig. 1 .
C. BIT MANIPULATION CONFUSION
Next, the image P' obtained after adding the random value pixels is permutated. The specific permutation process is as follows:
Step 1: Convert the chaotic matrix S with the size of (M + 2) × (N + 2) into the same representation format as the pixels of P'.
Step 2: Generate an index matrix I with the size of (M +2)× (N + 2), where each element of I is the sequence number of P' from left to right and from top to bottom.
Step 3: Convert each element of S, I , and P' into the binary sequences. And concatenate the binary sequences of these three matrices at the corresponding coordinates, therefore form the binary sequence matrix R with the size of (M + 2)×(N + 2).
Step 4: Sort R row by row in ascending order.
Step 5: Sort R column by column in ascending order.
Step 6: Fetch every pixel of permutated P' from R to form the output image T .
D. BIT MANIPULATION DIFFUSION
In the diffusion process of LAS-IES, the current pixel of T is XORed successively with the previous diffused pixel and the corresponding element of S.
where T i,j is the pixel that need to be diffused currently, O i,j is the diffused pixel, S i,j is the element of S. Q = M + 2 and W = N + 2 represents the number of rows and columns of T respectively. In the decryption process, reverse processing is performed as follows:
The permutation process and the diffusion process of LAS-IES will be iterated twice to generate the final cipher image.
III. IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS
First of all, it is important to note that, in this paper, we use the suffix H to indicate that a value is a hexadecimal value. In addition, since LAS-IES encrypts binary images, grayscale images, and color images in the same way, for the sake of brevity, this paper only discusses the encryption of grayscale images with 256 grayscale levels. Through careful study on the original paper, we have identified following security, practicability, and rationality problems in it.
A. INAPPROPRIATE DESCRIPTIONS
Firstly, Section 4.1 of the original paper is titled ''Secret key generation,'' but in fact the described process is a process of using a secret key to generate (x 1 0 , y 1 0 , µ 1 ) and (x 2 0 , y 2 0 , µ 2 ), which are the initial values and control parameters of 2D-LASM. In addition, the original authors provide an example. In their example, the secret key Secondly, in Section 1, Section 4.1, Section 4.3, Section 4.4, Section 4.5, and Section 7 of the original paper, the original authors have repeatedly mentioned that LAS-IES performs the bit-level permutation and the bit-level diffusion. However, as we can see from Section 4.3 and Section 4.4 of the original paper, each pixel of input image is processed as a whole during the permutation process and the diffusion process. Furthermore, we can also see from many chaotic image encryption schemes [29] - [32] , how should the real bit-level permutation and/or the bit-level confusion process the input image. Therefore, the description of processing granularity in the original paper should be changed from the bit-level to the pixel-level.
B. GENERATION OF CHAOTIC MATRICES
In a chaotic image encryption scheme, it is particularly important to utilize the state value sequences efficiently and reasonably, since this is closely related to the practicability and security of the encryption scheme. However, the original authors do not provide the generation details of chaotic matrices S 1 and S 2 used in LAS-IES. In Section 4.1 of the original paper, the original authors only mention ''Using the two groups of initial states, two chaotic matrices S 1 and S 2 can be generated by 2D-LASM.'' Since we also need to implement LAS-IES in the simulation tests, following steps are taken to generate the chaotic matrices S 1 and S 2 . Let us take the chaotic matrix with the size of (64+2)×(64+2) as an example.
Step 1: Iterate 2D-LASM 1000 times to avoid the transition state.
Step 2: After iterating 2D-LASM 2178 times, the chaotic state value sequence with the length of 4356 is obtained, that is, two state values obtained in each iteration are stored in the state value sequence CS.
Step 3: Convert the state values in the form of floating point number into the chaotic matrix elements of same representation format as the plain image pixels.
where floor(•) returns the largest integer that no larger than the operand.
Step 4: Reshape S into the two-dimensional matrix with the size of 66×66.
C. UNREASONABLE PARAMETER GENERATION
Algorithm 1 of the original paper is unreasonable, and can be significantly simplified. This algorithm processes the secret key K bit by bit in a big-endian manner to generate the chaotic system parameters. We can take γ 2 as an example, and try to repeat the chaotic-system-parameter-generation process of it. According to original Algorithm 1, the value of γ 2 is calculated as follows:
In the example of the original paper, the last 12 bits of K are the binary sequence with the hexadecimal value of 490 H , namely, binary value of 0100 1001 0000. Therefore
Similarly, we can calculate the value of γ 1 . Without the 490 H part, the hexadecimal value of last 12 bits of K is 04B H , that is, binary value of 0000 0100 1011.
The calculation results are completely consistent with the original paper, so the original authors do use this big-endian calculation method to calculate the values of chaotic system parameters. Moreover, this big-endian calculation method is not caused by a special software and hardware platform, because the data exemplified in Fig. 7 of the original paper is in the common little-endian form.
Next, we will simplify Algorithm 1 of the original paper. If we use the little-endian calculation method to generate the chaotic system parameters, in order to get the same results, VOLUME 7, 2019 we need to flip the binary sequences first. For example, flip 0100 1001 0000 to 0000 1001 0010. When calculating the values of flipped binary sequences, we no longer need to calculate them bit by bit. And when it comes to γ 1 and γ 2 , even no calculation is needed. Let us taking the Intel (R) Core (TM) i7-4770 CPU and Python programming language used by the original authors as an example, Python running on this CPU is fully capable of directly representing and processing the 52-bit binary numbers. In this way, x 0 , y 0 , µ, w, γ 1 , and γ 2 can be obtained in only four calculations, instead of the complicated bitwise calculations of the original paper. Besides, since this flipping is a one-to-one mapping in the mathematical sense, it does not have any substantial influence on the key space of LAS-IES and the generation of chaotic system parameters. Consequently, we only need to select the corresponding value K ' from the beginning, and need not to actually flip K . For example, if we want to get the same chaotic system parameter values, only need to select the following K ':
where indicates that a hexadecimal value is obtained by concatenating 2 hexadecimal values. Since the 64-bit processor can directly represent and process the 64-bit unsigned integer, it is no need to convert k 1 , k 2 , k 3 , k 4 , k 5 , and k 6 into the binary sequences. We can directly calculate the values of x 0 , y 0 , µ, and w, whereas γ 1 and γ 2 . can be used directly.
The calculation results are completely consistent with the ones in the original paper. However, not only that, we can further simplify the generation process of chaotic system parameters. Since the generation of each parameter is similar, we only describe the simplified generation process of x 1 0 . Similarly, we can get the simplified calculation methods of other chaotic system parameters.
As we can see, x 0 , y 0 , µ, w, γ 1 , and γ 2 are no need to exist at all. And we can calculate the values of (x 1 0 , y 1 0 , µ 1 ) and (x 2 0 , y 2 0 , µ 2 ) directly through k 1 , k 2 , k 3 , k 4 , k 5 , and k 6 . Therefore, we can finally implement the following simplified algorithm.
D. EQUIVALENT SECRET KEYS
LAS-IES also has the problem of equivalent secret keys. That is, same chaotic system parameters can be obtained by using different secret keys, thereby obtaining the exactly same key stream, and producing the exactly same encryption and decryption effect. As a result, the key space of LAS-IES is not as large as the claimed one of original authors. And the argument on key space and key sensitivity in Section 6.1 of original paper does not hold either. Since Algorithm 1 of our paper is more convenient to discuss and is equivalent in mathematical sense to the original one, we will use Algorithm 1 to discuss the equivalent-secret-key problem. As we can see from Algorithm 1, in order to generate the same chaotic system parameters with K a and K b ,
the following equation group must be satisfied.
As shown below, we can simplify the equation group into (11) .
Thus, for the given K a , we only need to construct K b satisfying (11), then the same chaotic system parameters can be generated by K b . In order to satisfy (11), we first try to satisfy the following part of it.
We can convert (12) into (13) .
Therefore, as long as we can find other factorization results of a 3 × (a 2 − a 1 ), and make sure that new factors b 3 ∈ (0, 2 52 ), 2 12 ) and the obtained (b 4 , b 5 , b 6 ) ∈ (0, 2 52 ), then we can obtain the equivalent secret key K b . Next, we try to find a specific equivalent key pair in the key space of LAS-IES. Let us say a 2 = a 1 and b 2 = b 1 , then we choose b 3 ∈ (0, 2 52 ), b 2 ∈ (0, 2 12 ) and calculate the values of b 4 , b 5 , b 6 according to (11) . If the obtained (b 4 
According to (11), we can get
And (b 4 
Thus we can get
As we can see, there are a large number of b 2 and b 3 that satisfy (15) . That is to say, when a 2 = a 1 and b 2 = b 1 , we can construct a large number of equivalent secret key pairs. For example, suppose there is
At this time, a 2 = a 1 = 100 H = 256 satisfies a 2 = a 1 . According to (15) , we can get
As we know, there are a lot of b 3 and b 2 that satisfy (16). We choose
H , according to (14) , we can get
Consequently, we obtain an equivalent secret key
A5AD2B724169E608BBBD1F2109C9F5H
Through checking, we find that the chaotic system parameters generated by K a are In fact, not only that, we can also find an equivalent secret key for a given secret key. Let us take the secret key
given in Section 4.1 of original paper as an example. According to Algorithm 1 in this paper, its corresponding value is 6 , and according to (11) , we can get
Further, we let b 3 = 2 × a 3 , that is, for a 3 = 09AC51F29EAC2 H , let b 3 = 1358A3E53D584 H . Then according to (17) , we can get
H . In this way, for the secret key
we find out an equivalent secret key
E. LARGE NUMBER OF RANDOM VALUES
Before the permutation process, LAS-IES performs a large number of random value pixel additions, the number of added pixels is up to 2×(N + 2) + 2 × M . This design is extremely unreasonable. Firstly, this will reduce the practicability of LAS-IES. Specifically, a large number of random values need to be prepared before each encryption, and additional burden of data encryption and transmission also need to be undertaken; Secondly, the design of this one-time pad nature is obviously not in line with the design principles of modern cryptosystems. According to Kerckhoffs' principle, the security of encryption scheme should be completely dependent on the secret key, rather than other secret parameters [33] , not to mention the large number of random values of one-time pad nature. In addition, under the conditions of chosen plaintext attack, the random-value-pixel insertion of LAS-IES is meaningless. We can demonstrate this from two perspectives: 1) According to Kerckhoffs' principle, only the secret key is unknown to attackers. For the cipher image to be attacked, the attackers can use the known random value pixels to construct chosen plain images, and use the unknown secret key that remains unchanged to obtain the corresponding cipher images of these chosen plain images.
2) Since LAS-IES is completely open, under the conditions of chosen plaintext attack, the attackers can treat both the random value pixels and the ordinary plain image pixels as plain image pixels. For the cipher image with the size of (M + 2)×(N + 2) that need to be attacked, the attackers can construct chosen plain images with the same size, namely, (M + 2)×(N + 2). And then use the unknown secret key that remains unchanged to obtain the corresponding cipher images of these chosen plain images.
F. UNREASONABLE PERMUTATION PROCESS
Because the processing details are different, the original authors have described the inverse one of diffusion process, which guarantees the reversibility of diffusion process. However, they have not described the inverse one of permutation process, so we reasonably believe that the inverse one of permutation process is not substantially different. During decryption, we first construct R through chaotic matrix S, index matrix I and input image T , and sort R, and then try to obtain the plain image or the intermediate cipher image. However, we cannot obtain the plain image or the intermediate cipher image in this way. Therefore, the permutation process of LAS-IES is irreversible.
In fact, according to the permutation process of LAS-IES, to decrypt the plain image or the intermediate cipher image, we must first obtain the sorted I of R, which can be marked as I p . Then, concatenate the binary sequences of I p and T , and perform the intra-column sorting and intra-row sorting successively. However, the original authors have not explained how to obtain I p during decryption. As we know, there are only two ways to obtain it. The first one is that the encrypting party sends I p to the decrypting party; the second one is that the decrypting party sorts the matrix obtained by concatenating S and I to obtain I p . But the first way is not practical, to encrypt the plain image with the size of M × N , it is necessary to transmit I p with the size of (M + 2) × (N + 2) through a secure channel, such an encryption scheme has no meaning. Therefore, we can only take the second way.
There is another rationality problem in the permutation process of LAS-IES. That is, the binary conversions and the concatenations are unnecessary. As we can see from Section 4.3 of the original paper and Section II-B of this paper, the permutation process of LAS-IES is actually to permutate the input image P by sorting S. This is a simple process that takes only 2 steps.
Step 1: Sort S row by row in ascending order. During sorting, if the position of an element of S is changed, then apply the same position change to the pixel of P at the corresponding coordinate.
Step 2: Sort S column by column in ascending order. During sorting, if the position of an element of S is changed, then apply the same position change to the pixel of P at the corresponding coordinate. However, LAS-IES gives a very complicated implementation of this process, which wastes both space and time. Therefore, we simplify Algorithm 2 of the original paper as follows:
G. UNCHANGED KEY STREAMS
The key streams used in the permutation process and the diffusion process of LAS-IES are generated by the chaotic system 2D-LASM. As we know, a chaotic system is TABLE 2. Simplified permutation process. a deterministic system. If the initial values and control parameters of a chaotic system remains unchanged, then the chaotic state values generated by it are exactly the same. However, the chaotic system parameters of 2D-LASM are completely independent of the plain image and are completely determined by the secret key. Therefore, when encrypting different plain images, if the secret key remains unchanged, the key streams used in the encryption process remain completely unchanged.
IV. CRYPTANALYSIS AND PROPOSED ATTACK ALGORITHM
In this section, we first perform the cryptanalysis on LAS-IES and then propose the specific attack algorithm.
A. CRYPTANALYSIS OF LAS-IES
Next, we cryptanalyze the entire encryption process of LAS-IES and determine the relationship between the plain image pixels and the cipher image pixels. According to Section III-E of this paper, under the conditions of chosen plaintext attack, the random value pixels inserted are known, or at least remain unchanged. As we can see, in addition to changing the size of plain image, the pixels inserted by LAS-IES will not actually have any substantial impact on the entire encryption process. Therefore, we do not consider the pixel insertion in LAS-IES for the time being, or we temporarily treat the inserted pixels as the ordinary plain image pixels. For the sake of simplicity, we take a 3×3 plain image as an example for cryptanalysis. Moreover, the discussion of images in this paper is carried out in one-dimensional form. That is, it is assumed that there is a plain image P = {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 , P 5 , P 6 , P 7 , P 8 , P 9 }, after two rounds of permutation and diffusion as shown in Fig. 2 , the cipher image C = {C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 , C 5 , C 6 , C 7 , C 8 , C 9 } is obtained.
In Fig. 2 , we present a possible permutation and diffusion result. During the actual encryption process, the specific locations of permutated image pixels, as well as the specific values of diffused image pixels may vary. However, this does not prevent us from discussing the compositions of cipher image pixels. FIGURE 2. Encryption process of P = {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 , P 5 , P 6 , P 7 , P 8 , P 9 }.
At first, the first round of permutation is performed, as shown in Fig. 2 . At this point, the plain image pixels will have coordinate changes, that is, the positions of pixels will change, but the values of pixels will not change. Next is the first round of diffusion, the coordinates of pixels after permutation will not change, but the values of pixels will change. According to (5), we can determine the corresponding relationship between the intermediate cipher image pixels, the plain image pixels, and the chaotic matrix elements.
where For the second round of permutation and diffusion, as shown in Fig. 2 , all I i will also be permutated first, that is, the coordinates of them will be changed, and then diffused, namely, the values of them will be changed. Similarly, according to (5), we can determine the corresponding relationship between the final cipher image pixels, the intermediate cipher image pixels, and the chaotic matrix elements.
where (18) into (19) . According to the reflexivity of XOR operation, that is, X ⊕ Y ⊕ Y = X , we can eliminate P i and S 1,i that repeatedly appears twice.
Finally, we get the corresponding relationship between C i and P i . According to observations, we find that C i is the XOR operation result of a number of P i , S 1,i , and S 2,i . And because of the reflexivity of XOR operation, these XOR operands will not be repeated. Moreover, we know that the numbers and the coordinates of P i , S 1,i , and S 2,i are completely determined by S 1 and S 2 . As a result, we can draw the following conclusion.
Theorem 1: If the plain image P with the size of Q × W is encrypted using LAS-IES to obtain the cipher image C, then the composition of C i (i = 1, 2, . . . , Q × W ) of C completely depends on the chaotic matrices S 1 and S 2 used, and is independent of P.
Proof: We first prove that the composition of C is completely determined by S 2 during the conversion from intermediate cipher image I to C. Then, we will prove that during the conversion from P to I , the composition of I is completely determined by S 1 . For the composition of C 1 , it is known from (5)
where I 1 and I Q×W are the first pixel and the last pixel of permutated image I obtained by permutating I according to S 2 .
Namely, {I 1 , I Q×W } ∈ I , but exactly which two pixels of I are completely dependent on S 2 . Therefore, the composition of C 1 in C after the permutation and the diffusion depends entirely on S 2 . And for the composition of C 2 , it is also can be known from (5)
where I 2 is the second pixel of I obtained by permutating I according to S 2 . Namely, I 2 ∈ I , but exactly which one pixel of I is completely dependent on S 2 . Moreover, we have proved that the composition of C 1 is completely determined by S 2 . Therefore, the composition of C 2 in C after the permutation and the diffusion is also completely dependent on S 2 . By analogy, we can prove that the composition of remaining cipher image pixel C i (i = 3, . . . , Q × W ) also depends entirely on S 2 . Similarly, we can prove in a similar way that the composition of I is completely determined by S 1 during the conversion from P to I . Therefore, Theorem 1 holds.
B. PROPOSED ATTACK ALGORITHM
We assume that the size of cipher image C to be attacked is (M + 2) × (N + 2), that is, the size of the plain image P to be recovered is M × N . According to Section III-E of this paper, under the conditions of chosen plaintext attack, when encrypting chosen plain images, the pixels A i (i = 1, 2, . . . , 2 × (N + 2) + 2 × M ) added are consistent with the pixels added when encrypting P.
Firstly, according to Theorem 1 and Section IV-A of this paper, we can determine the composition of C i (i = 1, 2, . . . , (M + 2) × (N + 2)).
where and {f i,1 , f i,2 , . . . , f i,v } are completely determined by S 1 and S 2 , and are independent of P and A. Next, we choose the special plain image P 0 of all 0s, and the corresponding cipher image of it is C 0 . Because of the nature of XOR operation, namely, X ⊕ 0 = X , the composition of each pixel of C 0 is as follows:
where
) is the pixel of C 0 . If we XOR C under attack with C 0 , according to the reflexivity of XOR, the difference matrix D of them can be obtained.
where 
And after solving the XOR equation group, we can completely recover P without knowing any secret key related information. We change the first pixel of P 0 to 1, and mark this new chosen image as P 0,1 . After encrypting P 0,1 with the unknown secret key, we can obtain the corresponding cipher image C 0,1 . Similarly, the composition of C 0,1 can be determined according to Theorem 1 and Section IV-A of this paper. Similarly, through the chosen plain images P 0,j (j = 2, . . . , M × N ), in which the value of j-th pixel is 1 and the values of other pixels are all 0, we can also determine the influence of j-th pixel of P on each pixel of C. In this way, we determine whether the composition of D i in (24) contains P j or not. So far, we have obtained the M × N -ary XOR equation group with respect to the plain image pixel P i (i = 1, 2, . . . , M × N ), as shown in Fig. 3 .
As we can see, the number of equations in it is (M + 2) × (N + 2). The form of each equation is similar to (24) . And the difference is that we have determined the specific values of {a i,1 , a i,2 , . . . , a i,m } in each equation by the M × N chosen plain images.
Finally, we will solve the M × N -ary XOR equation group, so as to completely recover the plain image P.
At first, we construct a two-dimensional logical matrix CCP with the size of After the above processing, as shown in Fig. 4 , the first M × N rows of CCP constitute an identity matrix. In this way, the first M × N elements {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e M ×N } of DMV are equal to the M × N pixels of plain image P. At this point, we have completely recovered the plain image by solving the XOR equation group.
Based on the above, we finally implement the following attack algorithm. 
V. SIMULATION TESTS
In order to verify the effectiveness and feasibility of our attack algorithm, we attack many cipher images with the different sizes and contents in the simulation tests. And these cipher images are all obtained by using LAS-IES to encrypt the plain images. In the simulation tests, the hardware and software used is Intel (R) Pentium (R) CPU G3260 @ 3.30 GHz, 8 GB RAM, 64-bit Windows 7 Ultimate, and MATLAB R2017a (9.2.0.538062). To ensure the generality of simulation tests, we conduct hundreds of attacks on these cipher images obtained by using randomly selected secret keys from the key space. Without exception, we have successfully recovered the plain images. For each randomly selected secret key, we test as follows:
Step 1: The grayscale images Lena, Peppers, and Baboon with the size of 64×64 are encrypted with the secret key, so as to obtain the cipher images with the size of 66×66.
Step 2: The attack algorithm is used to attack the Lena cipher image. While recovering the plain image, the coefficient matrix CCP of XOR equation group obtained during the attack process is saved.
Step 3: The Peppers and Baboon cipher images are attacked by using the saved CCP. For the grayscale images with the size of 128×128, we conduct the attack tests in the same way. After a large number of successful tests, we have saved the following test results.
As we can see from Table IV , for the randomly selected secret keys and the cipher images of different sizes and contents, our attack algorithm can completely recover the plain images without knowing the secret keys. Therefore, the attack algorithm proposed in this paper is effective.
In addition, according to Section IV-B, we know that the attack algorithm of this paper is mainly composed of two parts, namely, constructing the XOR equation group and solving the XOR equation group. For the construction of XOR equation group, the attack algorithm needs to encrypt the M ×N +1 chosen plaint images. Since LAS-IES encrypts the plain images pixel by pixel and the time complexity of it is O ((M × N ) ), the time complexity to encrypt these chosen plain images is O ((M × N ) In summary, the time complexity of our attack algorithm is O ((M × N ) 3 ), so it is computationally feasible. The tests that we have done also prove this. In our tests, it take only 90 s and 2000 s to recover the plain images with the sizes of 64×64 and 128×128. Consequently, for larger cipher images, we can reduce the time duration required to recover a plain image to a reasonable level by enhancing the computational power of a single computational unit, increasing the number of computational units, and parallelizing the computational process.
VI. MORE IMPROVEMENTS TO LAS-IES
In Section III-B, Section III-C, and Section III-D of this paper, we have made some improvements, which are aimed at the problems in chaotic matrix generation, chaotic-systemparameter generation and permutation process. In fact, for the problems of equivalent secret key, random-value-pixel insertion and unchanged key streams, we can further make the following improvements.
1) For the problem of equivalent secret keys, the process of generating chaotic system parameters by the secret key should be simplified as much as possible. That is, we should do a one-to-one conversion instead of a many-to-one conversion. This can actually be checked by the reversibility of the conversion process. If the chaotic system parameters cannot be converted to the unique secret key after the reverse process, then the rationality of the design needs to be reconsidered. In addition, the use of chaotic sequences should be diversified to avoid the problem of weak secret keys.
2) We should always pay attention to whether all steps in the encryption process conform to the design principles of cryptosystem, such as Kerckhoffs' principle. With regard to the problem of random-pixel-value insertion, we can solve it by inserting pixels that are related to the plain image and generated by the encryption scheme. Moreover, The number of inserted pixels should also be reduced to avoid excessive calculation and communication overhead.
3) If an encryption scheme keeps the key stream unchanged when encrypting different plain images, it is vulnerable to chosen plaintext attack. Therefore, we can consider adopting appropriate methods, such as calculating the hash value of plain image or the statistics of plain image features, to integrate these plain image related information into the generation process of chaotic system parameters. In this way, different plain images can be encrypted and decrypted with different key streams to ensure higher security.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, LAS-IES is analyzed and studied comprehensively, and some problems identified in it are pointed out. while pointing out these problems, we also make some improvements to the problems in chaotic matrix generation, chaotic-system-parameter generation and permutation process. In addition, based on the analysis of Section III-E, that is, under the conditions of chosen plaintext attack, we cryptanalyze LAS-IES, and find that the M ×N -ary XOR equation group with respect to the plain image can be obtained by the M × N + 1 chosen plain images. Then, we propose the specific attack algorithm for constructing and solving the XOR equation group. In Section V, we carry out a lot of simulation tests on the proposed attack algorithm. The test results show that the proposed attack algorithm is feasible, and it can completely recover the plain images without knowing any secret key related information. Finally, we also propose our improvement suggestions for the problems of equivalent secret keys, random-pixel-value insertion, and unchanged key streams. In the future, we will further realize the possible improvements to LAS-IES proposed in this paper, so as to propose a complete improved chaotic image encryption scheme, and prove the security, feasibility, and practicability of the new scheme from both theoretical analysis and test data. 
